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everywhere the crosses are burning,
sharp-shooting goose-steppers around every corner,
there are snipers in the schools...(I know you don't believe this.
You think this is nothing
but faddish exaggeration. But they
are not shooting at you.)
Lorna Dee Cervantes'
Unheard by dominant society, the daily specter of assaultive hate
speech haunts most minorities on America's campuses. Many universi-
ties are beginning to address this rising tide of racism and hate speech on
their campuses.2 Several state university systems, including the Univer-
sity of California (UC), have chosen to combat this trend by developing
regulations which bar students from using such speech on school
grounds.
The reaction from eminent first amendment scholars has been pre-
dictably myopic and unimaginative. In criticizing the UC's recently
* J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1990; B.A., Texas A&M University, 1983. The author
wishes to acknowledge and thank Professor Mar Matsuda for the profound influence her
ground-breaking article had on the author's approach to this painful issue. A great deal more
legal scholarship, like Matsuda's, which eschews the mainstream's supposed objectivity and
detached formalism, for a more personal, contextual and challenging approach, is needed to
rid the law of its ongoing legitimation of the myth of racial equality in America. In addition,
the author extends his heartfelt thanks to the folks at the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) of Northern California for their ideas, patience, and illuminating debate.
1. L. Cervantes, Poem for the Young White Man Who Asked Me How I An Intelligent
Well-Read Person Could Believe in the War Between Races, in CONTEMPORARY CHICANA
POETRY 89-90 (M. Sanchez ed. 1985), cited in Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2335 (1989). Mari Matsuda is an
Associate Professor of Law at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii.
2. There are more than 20 such regulations and proposed regulations in existence. Law-
rence, When Racism Dresses in Speech's Clothing: Reconciling the First and Fourteenth
Amendments (draft copy presented as paper at 1989 ACLU Biennial Conference) at 4.
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adopted policy, Floyd Abrams, the first amendment specialist at the New
York law firm of Cahill, Gordon & Reindel, accused UC officials of
"banning words that make people feel bad, which sweeps well beyond
what the [flirst [a]mendment protects. It goes too far and is probably
unconstitutional."3 Abrams chastised civil rights organizations, notably
the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California,
for their failure to universally condemn the policy as a patent first
amendment violation: "Theirs is a pallid response to a plain violation of
the [flirst [a]mendment. To call offensive language a denial of access,
and then to use it to trump a [flirst [a]mendment right is a failure of
courage for any civil liberties organization.,' 4
Judicial response has been equally critical, although more support-
ive of the university's goals. In the only case to consider a campus hate
speech policy, a U.S. district court judge in Michigan recently declared
the University of Michigan's policy unconstitutional, holding: "While
the Court is sympathetic to the University's obligation to ensure equal
education opportunities for all of its students, such efforts must not be at
the expense of free speech. Unfortunately, this was precisely what the
University did." 5
Although it is obvious and somewhat banal to note that the regula-
tion of hate speech involves a conflict of equally weighty constitutional
concerns-the victim's fourteenth amendment rights and the speaker's
first amendment rights-the recognition of this conflict must be the start-
ing point for any thoughtful analysis, especially in the university campus
context. To focus only on the doctrinal question of whether university
community members have the absolute or qualified right to utter racist
speech-as Abrams and the Doe court seemingly do-is to deny that
there is a victim on the other end of these verbal assaults.6 Hence, the
aim of this Note is to balance these constitutional concerns without first
presuming that hate speech is protected by the first amendment.
3. Shapiro, UC's Doctrine of Silence, The Recorder, Oct. 2, 1989, at 1, col. 2. Harvard
Law School Professor Laurence Tribe, for his part, called the UC policy "astonishingly elastic,
broad and vacuous," and said it stretches the fighting words doctrine "to prevent words which
cause emotional stress." Id. at 15, col. 1.
4. Id. at col. 4.
5. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1989). This decision
will be examined more closely in Section III.
6. Both the ACLU of Southern California and of Northern California have apparently
understood this, as evidenced by the sometimes divisive debate among the ACLU foundations'
respective boards in trying to develop a general policy on campus hate speech regulations in
response to the UC provision. The Northern California chapter of the ACLU issued a policy
statement, entitled A CL U-NC Policy Concerning Racist and Other Group-Based Harassment on
College Campuses, in July, 1990. For the complete text of this statement, see the Addendum
to this Note, infra at 615.
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Section I briefly examines the frightening plight of a hate speech
victim in the peculiar setting of a university campus. A survey of the
development of "hostile environment" discrimination in the employment
context will serve as a useful illustration of how the law has addressed
such hate speech. Section II charts the traditionally broad protection
given to offensive speech, paying close attention to the question of
whether university regulation of hate speech fits under any of the estab-
lished exceptions to the first amendment. Section III criticizes the awk-
ward "fighting words" construction chosen by the UC. Reference to the
example and shortcomings of the University of Michigan provision will
aid in examining the UC's clumsy and vague policy. Section IV proposes
an alternative policy that addresses hate speech with a clearly and nar-
rowly defined exception in first amendment doctrine. In framing this




A. Effects of Hate Speech on the University Community
It is appropriate to begin this analysis by telling the story of the
victim-the minority student at a university. This focus on the effects of
racism is the hallmark of what Professor Mari Matsuda, in her highly
incisive article on this issue, terms "outsider jurisprudence." 7 Outsider
thinking about law is characterized by "[t]he need to attack the effects of
racism and patriarchy in order to attack the deep, hidden, tangled roots
...."I Its methodology is "grounded in the particulars of [the outsid-
ers'] social reality and experience. This method is consciously both his-
torical and revisionist, attempting to know history from the bottom."9
The college years are particularly formative and vulnerable for most
young adults. As Professor Matsuda describes in her article:
The typical university student is emotionally vulnerable for several rea-
sons. College is a time of emancipation from a pre-existing home or
community, of development of identity, of dependence-independence
conflict, of major decision making, and formulation of future plans.
The move to college often involves geographic relocation-a major
life-stress event-and the forging of new peer ties to replace old ones.
All of these stresses and changes render the college years critical in
development of one's outlook on life .... A negative environmental
7. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2325.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2324 (emphasis added).
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response during this period of experimentation could mar for life an
individual's ability to remain open, creative, and risk-taking. 10
Students rely heavily on the university community for their social, intel-
lectual, and spiritual development and for their evolving self-definition.
The minority student enters this setting at risk, academically, socially,
and psychologically. I I It is precisely because students are in such a frag-
ile stage in their lives that the disturbing epidemic of campus racism is so
troubling.' 2 It is not surprising, therefore, that minority students feel a
greater sense of alienation and discomfort than do their white counter-
parts in both social and intellectual interactions on campus.13 This ap-
prehension of racist attacks has prompted many minority students to
avoid white-dominated universities and opt for traditionally minority-
dominated schools, where application and enrollment figures are reach-
ing record levels."'
Matsuda argues that official tolerance of hate speech in this hostile
university setting is more harmful than diffuse tolerance in the greater
society. I5 Impressionable student perpetrators are harmed in that they
participate in a lesson of getting-away-with-it that has lifelong repercus-
sions. Already fragile victims are debilitated because they perceive the
university as taking sides through inaction and thus feel isolated in their
effort to cope with the damage wrought by hate speech. Finally, the uni-
versity's lofty goals of education, self-development, ethics and the robust
clash of intellectual discussion are compromised by the inhibited and
hostile atmosphere left in the wake of hate speech attacks.
10. Id. at 2370 n.249 (emphasis added).
11. See id. at 2370-71.
12. See Lord, Frats and Sororities: The Greek Rites of Exclusion, Racism and Sexism, 245
NATION 10 (1987) (At the University of Michigan, for example, incidents included racist leaf-
lets in dorms, verbal abuse of African-American students, white students painting themselves
black and placing rings in their noses at "jungle parties"); See also White, The New Racists,
Ms. MAG., Oct. 1987, at 68 (reporting racist incidents at the University of Michigan, the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the University of Wisconsin, the University of New
Mexico, Columbia University, Wellesley College, Duke University, and the University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles); Wiener, Reagan's Children, Racial Hatred on Campus, 248 NATION
260 (1989) ("At the University of Michigan, a campus radio announcer referred to African
hair as 'pubic' hair. At Dartmouth, a professor was called 'a cross between a welfare queen
and a bathroom attendant' and the Dartmouth Review purported to quote a black student,
'Dese boys be sayin' that we be comin' here to Dartmut an' not takin' the classics. You know,
Homa.... .' At the University of Wisconsin, a fraternity held a mock 'slave auction' and other
fraternities held black-face 'Harlem parties' and used anti-Semitic remarks. At Purdue Uni-
versity, a counselor found 'Death N__r' scratched on her door"). See generally Matsuda,
supra note 1, at 2333 n.71.
13. Loo & Rolison, Alienation of Ethnic Minority Students at a Predominantly White Uni-
versity, 57 J. HIGHER EDUc. 58 (1986).
14. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2371 n.251.
15. Id. at 2371.
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"Victims of vicious hate propaganda have experienced physiological
symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut, rapid
pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress
disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide."' 6 Single incidents of
hate speech cause this pain because they draw upon and intensify the
cumulative effects of the stigmatization, labeling, and disrespectful treat-
ment that the victim has previously suffered. 7 "The accumulation of
negative images ... present[s] [minorities] with one massive and destruc-
tive choice: either to hate one's self, as culture so systematically de-
mand[s], or to have no self at all, to be nothing."' 8
Climbing the socioeconomic ladder does not diminish the psycho-
logical harms caused by hate speech. The inconsistent treatment which
upwardly mobile members of minorities face in business and managerial
careers exacts a toll of continuing stress, strain, and frustration. "As a
result, the incidence of severe psychological impairment caused by envi-
ronmental stress of prejudice and discrimination is not lower among mi-
nority group members of high socioeconomic status."' 9
In addition, the oft-championed remedy of "more speech" is fre-
quently useless because it may provoke only further abuse or because the
insulter is in a position of authority over the victim. "The racial invec-
tive is experienced as a blow, not a proffered idea; and, once the blow is
struck, it is unlikely that a dialogue will follow. Racial insults are partic-
ularly undeserving of first amendment protection because the perpetra-
tor's intention is not to discover truth or initiate dialogue but to injure
the victim."2 °
16. Id. at 2336; see also id. at 2336 n.84. See generally Delgado, Words That Wound.- A
Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133
(1982).
17. See Delgado, supra note 16, at 146. See also Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2334-35 ("The
various implements of racism find their way into the hands of different dominant-group mem-
bers. Lower- and middle-class white men might use violence against people of color, while
upper-class whites might resort to private clubs or righteous indignation against 'diversity' and
'reverse discrimination.' Institutions-government bodies, schools, corporations-also perpet-
uate racism through a variety of overt and covert means. From the victim's perspective, all of
these implements inflict wounds, wounds that are neither random nor isolated. Gutter racism,
parlor racism, corporate racism, and government racism work in coordination, reinforcing ex-
isting conditions of domination.") (emphasis added).
18. Delgado, supra note 16, at 137 (quoting J. KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHIS-
TORY 195 (1970)). See also Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2338 ("To be hated, despised, and alone
is the ultimate fear of all human beings. However irrational racist speech may be, it hits right at
the emotional place where we feel the most pain. The aloneness comes not only from the hate
message itself, but also from the government response of tolerance.") (emphasis added).
19. Delgado, supra note 16, at 138.
20. Lawrence, supra note 2, at 14.
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Hate speech affects right-thinking majority group members as well,
making it harder for them to achieve a sense of common humanity. The
hostile societal atmosphere produced by hate speech distances majority
group members from victims and forces them to deal gingerly with any
social interaction with a victim-group member. Ultimately, these people
"share a guilty secret: their relief that they are not themselves the target
of racist attack. While they reject the Ku Klux Klan, they may feel am-
bivalent relief that they are not African-American, Asian, or Jewish.
Thus they are drawn into unwilling complacency with the Klan, spared
from being the feared and degraded thing."21
B. Judicial Definition of a "Hostile Environment" in the Employment
Context
Victims of hate speech and harassment have found some judicial
relief in employment discrimination cases. The Supreme Court has held
that creating an offensive or hostile working environment for individuals
on the basis of their race or sex constitutes actionable discrimination
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.22 The racially hostile envi-
ronment cause of action was first recognized in Rogers v. EEOC,23 which
held that an Hispanic complainant could establish a Title VII violation
by demonstrating that her employer created an offensive work environ-
ment by giving discriminatory service to its Hispanic clientele.2 4 How-
ever, "an employer's mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which
engenders offensive feelings in an employee" is not enough to establish a
hostile atmosphere-plaintiffs must prove more than a few isolated inci-
dents.25 The alleged harassment "must be sufficiently pervasive so as to
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working envi-
ronment."2 6 An employer who is aware of such an environment must
21. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2338-39.
22. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
23. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
24. The court found "that employees' psychological as well as economic fringes are statu-
torily entitled to protection from employer abuse, and that the phrase 'terms, conditions, [and]
privileges of employment' in Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its pro-
tective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or
racial discrimination .... One can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted
with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers .. " Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
25. Id.; see also Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986).
26. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1 1th Cir. 1982). In Snell, the racist
incidents creating a hostile environment at a correctional facility included vandalizing of cars
in an employee parking lot, utterance of racial epithets, the posting of racially derogatory
"literature" on bulletin boards and walls, denial by white guards of access to a locked bath-
room to minorities, harassing phone calls to homes of minority employees who filed com-
plaints, display of a picture of a black with a noose around his neck, dressing up of a Latino
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UC HATE SPEECH POLICY
take reasonable steps to remedy it, or face the possibility of prosecution
under Title VII.27
In 1980 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission drew
upon this body of judicial decisions in issuing guidelines which specified
that Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free
from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.28 The Meritor
Savings Bank Court relied heavily on these EEOC guidelines in holding
that in a sexual harassment case a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1)
that she was subjected to sexual misconduct; (2) that the misconduct was
unwelcome; and (3) that it was sufficiently severe to alter the working
environment.29
Until recently, plaintiffs in hostile work environment cases also had
causes of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1981, and courts had noted
"that resolution under Title VII was dispositive of the section 1981 claim
as well."'30 However, in Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, the Supreme
Court held that section 1981 does not cover racial harassment at the
work place, but rather only deals with conduct at the initial formation of
a contract and any subsequent renewal. While noting that most racial
harassment cases still would be actionable under Title VII, the Court
pointed out the crucial distinction between the two claims: "[A] plaintiff
in a Title VII action is limited to a recovery of backpay, whereas under
[section] 1981 a plaintiff may be entitled to plenary compensatory dam-
ages, as well as punitive damages in an appropriate case."
31
Any remedy that a hostile environment cause of action could pro-
vide to a campus hate speech victim is chimerical. First, these causes of
action are limited to the employment context, which is rarely where cam-
pus racism takes place. Second, the requirement that the existence of a
hostile environment be proven through a continuing pattern of abuse
would preclude remedy, given the more isolated, anonymous, and arbi-
trary nature of most campus hate incidents. Finally, the Patterson
inmate in a straw hat, sheet, and sign that read "Spic," and the posting of offensive photo-
graphs of half-naked black men and women in African garb. Snell, 782 F.2d at 1098.
27. Snell, 782 F.2d at 1104.
28. "Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Section 703 of Title VII. Unwelcome
sexual advances ... constitute sexual harassment when ... such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1989). A foot-
note to this section emphasizes that "[tihe principles involved here continue to apply to race,
color, religion or national origin." Id. at n. I. See also 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
29. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-68 (1986).
30. Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1254 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing
Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1252 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981)), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1015 (1986).
31. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2375 n.4 (1989).
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Court's virtual foreclosure of a section 1981 action seriously limits the
financial feasibility of bringing an action and also limits the effect of legal
action on subsequent hate speech perpetrators because no punitive dam-
ages are available under Title VII.
Yet the fact that legislatures and courts are addressing work harass-
ment provides important precedent to persuade elected officials and
judges to confront campus hate speech with even greater vigor. More-
over, the themes that these courts and legislatures have emphasized in
their discussions of hostile environment law, including a victim's four-
teenth amendment right to work in an environment free of harassment,
apply with equal force in the campus setting.
II
The First Amendment
A. Broad Protection Given to Offensive Speech
Courts traditionally have given offensive speech broad protection
under the first amendment as part "of a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks... ."I' The epitome of this broad
protection has been Cohen v. California,3 3 where the Supreme Court de-
clared unconstitutional the disturbing the peace conviction of a young
man for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a Cali-
fornia courthouse corridor. The Court stated that "it is nevertheless
often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric" and found that
those who were offended by Cohen's lyric could avoid offense "simply by
averting their eyes." 34
32. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
33. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
34. Id. at 21, 25. See also Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972). Dissenting
Justices Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist stated in opposition to the majority's ruling,
"When we undermine the belief that the law will give protection against fighting words and
profane and abusive language such as the utterances involved in this case, we take steps to
return to the law of the jungle." 408 U.S. at 901 (Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ.
dissenting). On remand, three New Jersey judges reconsidered the case in light of Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). Based on Good-
ing, the New Jersey judges vacated the prior judgment of conviction and dismissed the com-
plaint against the defendant. The opinion held that New Jersey's disorderly persons statute
was "overly broad and violative of the [flirst [a]mendment." 120 N.J. Super. 458, 459, 295
A.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 1972).
The defendant in Rosenfeld had addressed a public school board meeting attended by
about 150 people and "in the course of his remarks used the adjective 'm --- f- ----' on four
occasions to describe the teachers, the school board, the town, and his own country." 408 U.S.
at 904 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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The Court also has made it clear that when it comes to offensive
speech "state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the
sweep of the [fqirst [a]mendment.""a Thus, in Healy v. James, the Court
reversed as unconstitutional the expulsion of a journalism student for
distributing a newspaper which contained a reproduction of a political
cartoon depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the God-
dess of Justice, with a caption reading "With Liberty and Justice for
All," as well as an article, entitled Motherfucker Acquitted, which dis-
cussed the trial and acquittal of the leader of an organization called "Up
Against the Wall, Motherfucker."36
This broad reading of the first amendment also has been applied to
racist or hate speech. In Collin v. Smith," the Seventh Circuit declared
unconstitutional several Skokie, Illinois ordinances drafted to block a
demonstration by the American Nazi Party in the predominantly Jewish
community. In emphasizing that Skokie residents could avoid the Nazi
offense by "simply avoid[ing] the [demonstration site] for thirty minutes
on a Sunday afternoon," the court held that "[t]he result we have
reached is dictated by the fundamental proposition that if these civil
rights are to remain vital for all, they must protect not only those society
deems acceptable, but also those whose ideas it quite justifiably rejects
and despises." 3
Campus racist speech has also found first amendment protection. In
Joyner v. Whiting,39 the Fourth Circuit held that a university president
could not cut off a school newspaper's primary financial support because
the paper ran an article which exhorted black students to aggressively
protest the rapidly growing white campus population.'
B. Exceptions to the First Amendment
The Court has been willing to carve out several exceptions to the
first amendment:
35. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
36. Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973) (per curiam). The Court said
"[w]e think Healy makes it clear that the mere dissemination of ideas-no matter how offen-
sive to good taste--on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of
'conventions of decency.'" Id. at 670.
37. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
38. Id. at 1207, 1210.
39. 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
40. Id. at 462. The newspaper article stated as follows: "There is a rapidly growing white
population on our campus .... Black students on this campus have never made it clear to
those people that we are indeed separate from them, in so many ways, and wish to remain so.
And until we assume the role of a strong, proud people we will continue to be co-opted." Id.
at 458.
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There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting words'. . . . It
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.
4 1
1. Group Libel
The two traditional exceptions to the first amendment's strong pro-
tections which are most commonly proposed to deal with campus hate
speech are group libel and fighting words. Neither of these exceptions
works well in this area. In Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Supreme Court
upheld a criminal conviction for distributing a racist leaflet that por-
trayed, in violation of an Illinois statute, "depravity, criminality, unchas-
tity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or
religion which said publication exposes [such citizens] to contempt, deri-
sion, or obloquy . ... ,42 Emphasizing Illinois' history of bloody racial
riots and the tendency of racist speech to ignite this volatile situation, the
Court held "we are precluded from saying that speech concededly pun-
ishable when immediately directed at individuals cannot be outlawed if
directed at groups with whose position and esteem in society the affiliated
individual may be inextricably involved."'43
Many courts and commentators have maintained that, although
never expressly overruled, Beauharnais' value as precedent is extremely
doubtful with the development of modern constitutional libel law in New
. 41. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). Since Chaplinsky, the
Court has also excepted or weakened first amendment protection for indecent broadcasting
during daytime hours (FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)) and to prevent imminent
danger of a grave substantive evil (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam)).
42. 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1951). The defendant circulated a flyer which petitioned the city of
Chicago
to halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people, their
property, neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro .... If persuasion and the need
to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the Negro will not unite us,
then the aggressions [,] ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the Negro,
surely will.
Id. at 252.
43. Id. at 263.
The danger in these times from the coercive activities of those who in the delusion of
racial or religious conceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to
deprive others of their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is emphasized by
events familiar to all.
Id. at 261.
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York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc." In the most
thorough judicial examination of Beauharnais, Judge Pell, writing for the
court in Collin v. Smith, questioned whether the "tendency to induce
violence approach" sanctioned in Beauharnais could survive constitu-
tional muster after cases such as Cohen v. California, Gooding v. Wilson,
and Brandenburg v. Ohio, which require a more definite showing that the
speech will immediately result in a breach of the peace; and whether the
broad ability to punish libel given to the government in Beauharnais is
obsolete under New York Times and Gertz.45
Punishing campus group libel or racism upsets the delicate balance
between free speech and human dignity and threatens the very groups it
is intended to help. To vilify a group-no matter how pernicious or ig-
norant the accusations may be-is a socio-political statement by the
speaker. Although more emotionally destructive, the political nature of
the statement "Fuck the Jews," when addressed generally to society, is
virtually the same as "Fuck the Draft." It is precisely where such polit-
ical speech is involved that the "robust and uninhibited debate" spon-
sored by a strong first amendment should take place. It is in the
university's marketplace of ideas, not America's courtrooms or legisla-
tures, that the ignorance and injury of a "Fuck the Jews" attitude will be
illuminated. On the other hand, when someone directs a hate-filled com-
ment at an individual or group of individuals, it is more akin to an as-
sault than to a political statement-it is not intended to shape societal
views but rather to injure a human being. Racist assaults, therefore, do
not require absolute constitutional protection.
Moreover, another critique of the use of group libel to combat racist
hate speech, as Justice Douglas warned in his dissent to Beauharnais, is
44. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254; Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a discussion of
Beauharnais' doubtful value as precedent, see Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of
Expression and the Subordination of Groups, in 1990 ILL. L. REV. 55 n.159; Dworkin v. Hus-
tler Magazine, 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1978);
Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 n. 14 (8th Cir. 1973); Anti-Defamation League of
B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969). Nonetheless, Beauharnais has been cited with approval by some
Justices. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982); Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S.
916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
45. Collin, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1978); Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Gooding,
405 U.S. 518 (1972); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Yet some commentators urge the
revival of group libel laws. See Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the
Defamation of Groups, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 281; Au, Freedom From Fear, 15 LINCOLN L.
REV. 45 (1984) (arguing for a revival of Beauharnais in light of increases in anti-Asian violence
and propaganda); Lawrence, supra note 2, at 25, n.49; Note, A Communitarian Defense of
Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV. 682, 701 (1988) (tolerating vilification of certain groups
"erodes the conception of the good that animates American political life.").
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that the punishment of group libel can easily be turned on minorities
stridently pointing out the racism they suffer.4 6 All those who challenge
society to halt its racism in forceful and pointed language are at risk
under criminal group libel laws, which are drafted and controlled by that
same society.
2. "Fighting Words"
Many campus hate speech policies, including the UC policy at issue
in this Note, are doctrinally pigeon-holed under the "fighting words" ex-
ception. The Court defined this exception in 1942 in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire as "those [words] which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."' 47 Although at first
glance this definition, and particularly its first prong, seems well-suited to
combat campus hate speech, subsequent judicial interpretation has ren-
dered the exception too narrow to address hate speech effectively.
In Gooding v. Wilson,48 the Court struck down as unconstitutional a
Georgia statute that barred the use of "opprobrious words or abusive
language, tending to cause a breach of the peace . . . ."I The Court
found that the statute exceeded Chaplinsky's limits and was overbroad
because the vague definitions of "opprobrious" and "abusive" made "it a
'breach of the peace' merely to speak words offensive to some who hear
them, and so sweeps too broadly."" ° The Gooding Court emphasized
that when the Chaplinsky Court had carved out this exception it had
done so with reference to the New Hampshire Supreme Court's narrow
definition of "fighting words":
[N]o words [are] forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to
cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark
is addressed.... The test is what men of common intelligence would
understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to
fight.... Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within
46. "Today a white man stands convicted for protesting in unseemly language against our
decisions invalidating restrictive covenants. Tomorrow a Negro will be haled before a court
for denouncing lynch law in heated terms.... [This decision] represents a philosophy at war
with the [flirst [a]mendment-a constitutional interpretation which puts free speech under the
legislative thumb.... It is notice to the legislatures that they have the power to control unpop-
ular blocs. It is a warning to every minority that when the Constitution guarantees free speech it
does not mean what it says." Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 286-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added) (footnote omitted).
47. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
48. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
49. Id. at 519.
50. Id. at 527. The conviction was based on the defendant's remarks to police officers-
"White son of a bitch, I'll kill you. You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death."-while the
defendant was participating in a picketing protest against the Vietnam War. Id. at 519 n.1.
Apparently, the Court never has overturned a "fighting words" conviction except on an over-
breadth analysis. Delgado, supra note 16, at 173 n.241.
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the purview of the statute ... only when they have this characteristic of
plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace ....
Two years after Gooding, the Court again linked the two prongs of
the Chaplinsky definition in Lewis v. City of New Orleans,52 when it
struck down a Louisiana statute similar to the Georgia statute at issue in
Gooding. This narrow interpretation of Chaplinsky even commands a
majority of the Rehnquist Court. In City of Houston v. Hill,53 the Court
reiterated that it has "repeatedly invalidated laws that provide the police
with unfettered discretion to arrest individuals for words or conduct that
annoy or offend them."54 The Court concluded that "the [f]irst
[a]mendment recognizes, wisely we think, that a certain amount of ex-
pressive disorder not only is inevitable in a society committed to individ-
ual freedom, but must itself be protected if that freedom would
survive."55
Thus the narrow one-case nature of the "fighting words" exception,
together with the broad protection given offensive speech by Cohen and
its progeny, severely undermine the efficacy of using this established first
amendment exception to combat campus hate speech. As Matsuda
notes, the problem with punishing racist speech under the fighting words
exception "is that racist speech is so common that it is seen as part of the
ordinary jostling and conflict people are expected to tolerate, rather than
as fighting words." 6 This judicial requirement that the victim be likely
to lash out physically makes it very inappropriate for campus hate speech
targets. A more thorough discussion of this inapplicability of "fighting
words" to campus hate speech is set out in the next Section through an
examination of the UC policy.
51. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 313, 320-21,
18 A.2d 754, 758, 762 (1941)).
52. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974). The New Orleans ordinance
made it unlawful "for any person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious
language toward or with reference to any member of the city police .... Id. at 132. See also
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978) ("A conviction for less than words that at
least tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace cannot be justified under Chaplinsky.").
53. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
54. Id. at 465. The Court declared unconstitutional as overbroad a Houston ordinance
that made it "unlawful for any person to... in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt
any policeman in the execution of his duty." Id. at 455.
55. Id. at 472.
56. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2355. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922,
926 (5th Cir. 1982) (Use of the word "nigger" and aggressive physical hazing and racist slurs
were considered typical of offshore oil rig banter and "male interaction," and hence not viola-
tive of Title VII); Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D. Ohio
1975) (listing racial slurs as part of the historical "language of the factory").
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III
A Criticism of the University of California Hate
Speech Policy
The policy enacted by the University of California on September 21,
1989, stems from the "fighting words" exception and states:
Chancellors may impose discipline for violation of University policies
or campus regulations.57 Such violations include the following types
of misconduct: The use of "fighting words" by students to harass any
person(s) on University property ... or in connection with official Uni-
versity functions or University-sponsored programs. "Fighting
words" are those personally abusive epithets which, when directly ad-
dressed to any ordinary person are, in the context used and as a matter
of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction
whether or not they actually do so. Such words include, but are not
limited to, those terms widely recognized to be derogatory references
to race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, and other
personal characteristics. "Fighting words" constitute "harassment"
when the circumstances of their utterance create a hostile and intimi-
dating environment which the student uttering them should reasonably
know will interfere with the victim's ability to pursue effectively his or
her education or otherwise to participate fully in University programs
and activities.5"
A. "Fighting Words" Doctrine Is Awkward and Vague
The main problem with this policy lies in its vagueness, which has
its roots in the policy's reliance on the "fighting words" doctrine. As we
have seen, the "fighting words" doctrine has been interpreted to require
that the victim have an immediate and violent reaction to the words.59
Yet the more common reaction of hate speech victims is to flee rather
than to fight; internalizing the harm rather than escalating the conflict.
"Lack of a fight and admirable self-restraint then defines the words
[under the Chaplinsky doctrine] as nonactionable."'
The UC policy attempts to adapt or improve the Chaplinsky doc-
trine by maintaining that it does not matter "whether or not [the words]
actually do" provoke a violent reaction, and by pointing out that fighting
words "include, but are not limited to," those widely-recognized deroga-
tory references. Yet, the Court has never required that a victim of "fight-
57. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, POLICIES APPLYING TO CAMPUS ACTIVITIES, ORGA-
NIZATIONS, AND STUDENTS (Part A) § 51,000 (1943) [hereinafter POLICIES APPLYING TO
CAMPUS ACTIVITIES].
58. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITYWIDE STUDENT CONDUCT: HARASS-
MENT POLICY § 51.xx (unpublished addition to POLICIES APPLYING TO CAMPUS ACTIVITIES)
(Sept. 21, 1989) [hereinafter HARASSMENT POLICY].
59. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
60. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2356.
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ing words" actually be provoked-rather only that the "fighting words"
immediately cause the average person to become violent. The policy's
attempt to improve the Chaplinsky doctrine actually does not change it
and does not greatly aid the intimidated minority victim. The UC sys-
tem's general counsel admitted as much in a letter to a university execu-
tive: "It is my judgment, however, that any broad reliance on cases such
as Chaplinsky would ignore the clear and established trend in the law
away from punishment of pure speech on campus no matter how offen-
sive, except in face-to-face encounters which provoke violence, or immi-
nently and reasonably threaten to provoke violence."61
Moreover, the inclusion of derogatory class references as a type of
"fighting words" runs counter to the trend toward protecting isolated
incidents of offensive and racist speech in traditional first amendment
and Title VII cases. The UC official, in drafting a policy which insists
that "fighting words" are not limited to these derogatory class references,
appears to be attempting to save face for forcing a racist hate speech
policy into the awkward garb of "fighting words." Yet judicial interpre-
tations have left the "fighting words" exception a one-case category,
whose anachronistic purpose has been eliminated by the changing social
mores about what constitutes offensive language.62
Furthermore, the policy mysteriously supplements the "fighting
words" definition as including derogatory references to "other personal
characteristics." Must these "other characteristics" relate to race or the
other specified categories, or do they extend to unrelated characteristics
such as political beliefs or organization memberships-for example, call-
ing someone a "fascist" or a "card-carrying ACLU member"? Courts
since Chaplinsky-where, ironically, the defendant was convicted for
calling a city marshal a "damned fascist" and a "God damned racket-
eer" 63 -would find that such derogatory yet political references were
protected under the first amendment. The UC policy's catch-all category
seems to extend to protected speech.
In addition, the "fighting words" model inspires too narrow a vision
of hate speech. In this context, non-verbal symbols, like a burning cross
or a swastika, often can have an even more devastating effect than the
61. Letter from the University of California (UC) Office of the General Counsel to Senior
Vice President for Academic Affairs, William R. Frazer, at 6 (June 1, 1989).
62. Cf FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Although most of the Court's deci-
sions have reflected society's changing attitudes on what is offensive or unacceptable speech,
the Pacifica case, which held constitutional an FCC prohibition of radio broadcasting of inde-
cent programming during daytime hours, seems to be a retrenchment to a more conservative
view of social mores. Indecency has been construed to encompass a great deal of speech that
most people would not find highly offensive.
63. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
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spoken or written word. Thus, the definition of hate speech should also
include non-verbal symbols that, by virtue of their form, are commonly
understood to express hatred to a particular class of people.
The basic fault in both the UC policy and the fighting words doc-
trine lies in their focus: they concentrate on the victim's reaction rather
than the perpetrator's intent. The UC policy's reliance on fighting words
virtually forces victims to choose between being thick-skinned Spartans
impervious to insult or being hot-tempered maniacs ready to riot at the
slightest provocation. Instead the focus should be on whether the perpe-
trator intended to insult, hurt, or interfere with an individual victim
through the use of a derogatory class reference. Under this approach,
whether the startled minority victim shrank away in fright or shot back a
snappy response would make no difference. In essence, if the attacker
addressed a derogatory class reference to an individual, the attacker's
intent to inflict emotional injury and the damage to the victim would be
presumed. Such an intent requirement would exempt accidentally ut-
tered derogatory references or group-targeted references spoken in non-
captive audience settings. This broader breathing room for a perpetra-
tor's negligent or group-targeted diatribes is a necessary compromise that
reflects the recognition that a campus hate speech regulation must ac-
count for a speaker's broad first amendment freedoms."
The UC tries to bring the perpetrator's intent into its now quite dif-
ferent definition of "fighting words" by providing that words are harass-
ing when they create an intimidating and hostile environment-another
term with an inapplicable existing meaning. The policy does not define a
"hostile environment" and leaves only the meaning from Title VII cases.
The definition provides little protection to campus hate speech victims.
As we have seen, Title VII cases have held that a hostile environment is
not established by the "mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet
which engenders offensive feelings," but rather by a concerted pattern of
abuse.65 This standard greatly limits its applicability to the non-employ-
ment campus setting because the harassment suffered by campus hate
speech victims are generally unrelated or one-time occurrences. Thus,
64. Some would argue that since the victim's injury from negligent or group-targeted epi-
thets is just as egregious as injury from intentionally directed slurs, a showing of intent should
not be required. However, given our historical commitment to broad free speech rights, some
balance between the opposing constitutional interests here must be struck, and requiring that
the assault be directed at an individual when it is in a non-captive setting provides a workable
and justifiable compromise. This requirement bars the more devastating and hateful personal
attacks, while allowing caustic but more socio-political group-targeted attacks. See supra text
accompanying notes 45-46 and infra text accompanying note 75.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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the university has tried unsuccessfully to force concepts developed in a
different context into the university mold.
B. Group vs. Individual Attacks
Ambivalence about the "fighting words" category also has caused
the university, by defining misconduct as the "use of 'fighting words' by
students to harass any person(s)," to be unclear about whether the policy
applies only to words directed at individuals or also those directed at
groups.66 Punishing derogatory references aimed at groups is both doc-
trinally questionable following the practical reversal of Beauharnais and
constitutionally impermissible because such group references are essen-
tially political statements ripe for ridicule in the marketplace of ideas.
However, if such a group libel is directed specifically at an individ-
ual or used in an individual's private sphere, such as a living or work
area, (for example, a derogatory flyer attached to a minority student's
dormitory door) it becomes an actionable individual libel. Even though
in this situation the derogatory reference is to a class as a whole, its in-
tent is to injure a particular individual or a small group of individuals
who are known to live or work in a specific area. Such speech is not
political; it is assaultive and deserves no protection.
The potentially overbroad nature of including derogatory references
about groups in non-private, non-individualized circumstances within a
policy's reach is illustrated by the fact that most of the violations prose-
cuted under the judicially rejected University of Michigan policy in-
volved group vilification in non-residential settings.67 Yet, because the
UC policy specifies several times that it is meant to apply to an individual
victim, this confusion can be clarified easily.
66. It should be noted that the author treats small groups of people as individuals in his
comparisons of groups and individuals because small groups (like individuals) can feel person-
ally attacked by hate speech directed at them. The University of Michigan (UM) policy ex-
pressly applied to both individuals and groups. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852,
853 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The UM policy established a three-tier system whereby the degree of
regulation was dependent on the location of the incident. In public areas, only an act of physi-
cal violence was actionable. In "educational centers," the policy prohibited "[a]ny behavior,
verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis" of class status and
either (1) "[i]nvolves an express or implied threat..." or (2) "[h]as the purpose or reasonably
foreseeable effect of interfering . . ." or (3) "[c]reates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning
environment .. " Finally, students in university housing must abide by the behavior obliga-
tions in their leases. Id. at 856.
67. See id. at Exhibit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (con-




The policy also expressly covers only speech uttered by students.6"
There is no compelling reason not to bind explicitly everyone in the uni-
versity community-faculty, administrators and staff as well as stu-
dents-to such a policy.6 9 If the goal is to create a less hostile
educational environment, does it matter what the status of the person
poisoning the atmosphere is? Concomitantly, no reason exists to limit
the status of victims covered by the policy. The UC policy, although
seemingly broad in its delineation of affected victims, does not specify
clearly whether it is intended to cover only student victims.
C. The Captive Audience Factor
The UC policy's dogged reliance on the "fighting words" niche also
precludes it from considering another important factor in regulating
campus speech-the locus of the speech. Courts have drawn the distinc-
tion between allowing traditionally protected offensive speech to be
barred when directed at a captive audience but protecting the same
speech when the victims could "simply avert their eyes."'70 The courts
68. The University of California did not include an analogous provision for faculty mem-
bers, but the UC Faculty Code of Conduct does prohibit faculty "[d]iscrimination against a
student on political grounds, or for reasons of race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, ethnic
origin, national origin, ancestry, marital status, medical condition, status as a Vietnam-era
veteran or disabled veteran, or ... because of age or citizenship or for other arbitrary or
personal reasons. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY POLICY ON FACULTY CON-
DUCT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF DISCIPLINE § II, THE FACULTY CODE OF CONDUCT AS
APPROVED BY THE ASSEMBLY OF THE ACADEMIC SENATE, part IIA(2) [hereinafter UC
FACULTY CODE] (footnote omitted) (Sept. 1, 1988). The same standard applies to discrimina-
tion against a fellow faculty member. Ik at part IID(2). When it comes to other members of
the university community, the UC FACULTY CODE only prohibits "[florcible detention,
threats of physical harm... harassment or intimidation... with the intent to interfere with
that person's performance of University activities." Id. at part IIC(4). Given that these provi-
sions do not mention speech specifically, it is unlikely, or at best unclear, if they are meant to
parallel the student hate speech policy.
69. Whether such a policy should apply to guests on the university campus is a complex
question. If the eradication of a threatening environment is truly intended, then guests should
not be exempt as either perpetrators or victims, but the jurisdictional questions would probably
be sticky. These questions would be obviated by the creation of parallel state or federal hate
speech laws, a subject discussed more fully in Section IV.
70. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (The Court upheld a city transit
system policy of not permitting political advertising on its transit vehicles because the speaker
"has no right to force his message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it....
[Tihe right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the
city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination
of ideas upon this captive audience."); Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 736-
37 (1970) (The Court upheld statute which allowed a householder to require a mailer of pan-
dering advertisements, which the householder determined to be "erotically arousing or sexu-
ally provocative," to remove his name from all its mailing lists and stop future mailings to
him); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) (The Court upheld a New Jersey ordinance
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reasoned that this would allow for great breathing space even for offen-
sive speech, while protecting the privacy of an unwilling audience.
The UC policy applies on all "University property" or "in connec-
tion with official University functions or University-sponsored pro-
grams." Such a non-differentiated approach ignores all the lessons
learned in the "captive audience" cases. A campus hate speech policy
should punish more severely speech in areas where university community
members are captive, such as dormitory rooms, communal living areas,
cafeterias, and offices. The victims in these places cannot "simply avert
their eyes" but must confront daily this hateful affront. By contrast, if a
flyer is posted or group vilification is occurring in the common areas of
the campus, the victim has the choice of simply leaving or not looking at
the offensive speech.71
Classrooms are a special captive audience situation. Frank and
uninhibited discussion in the classroom is essential to education. How-
ever, because students must attend class, the potential injury from indi-
vidually directed hateful speech is very great. Therefore, derogatory
speech should be allowed in the classroom only if it is not directed at any
identifiable individual in the class and presents a legitimate intellectual
theory or opinion. If however, such racist speech is directed at an indi-
vidual or presented as conclusive fact by either students or faculty, it
should be prohibited.72 The university must transfer a student victim
who can prove a pattern of individually directed hateful speech in a par-
ticular class into a comparable class with no academic penalty for the
prohibiting the use on public streets of sound trucks or instruments attached to vehicles which
emit "loud and raucous noises."). But cf Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212
(1975) (The Court declared unconstitutional an ordinance which prohibited showing films
containing nudity at a drive-in theater when its screen was visible from a public street or place
because "the screen of a drive-in theater is not 'so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an
unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it.' "); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971);
see supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
71. Some have argued that this common area/private area distinction is hollow, because a
victim cannot avert her ears from hearing hate speech directed at groups, which is bellowed in
the common areas of the campus. However, in order to ensure the broad protection given
speech in a traditionally public setting like the common areas of a campus, it is incumbent on
the victim to walk out of earshot of the hateful loudmouth. However, if the hate speech, even
if nominally directed at a group as a whole, is addressed to an individual in a public area, the
public/private area distinction loses all relevance. Finally, the situation of a victim being fol-
lowed by a hateful speaker is better addressed by a policy provision covering hate speech which
causes physical intimidation. See infra text accompanying note 73.
72. The UC FACULTY CODE does prohibit "[p]articipating in or deliberately abetting dis-
ruption, interference, or intimidation in the classroom." UC FACULTY CODE, supra note 68,
at § II, part IIA(5). Although it could be argued that "intimidation" covers hate speech di-
rected at an individual student, given the constitutional requirement that when a speech
abridgement is involved the regulation must be clearly narrowly tailored, the vagueness of the
provision's applicability to classroom hate speech would be fatal to its validity.
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student. The university ,should also take immediate steps to discipline
the offending professor or student.
In addition, the UC policy fails to address the rather technical but
important question of whether it will apply to university functions taking
place away from university property. This question can probably be an-
swered by determining if the audience on this non-university property is
captive.
D. Physically Threatening or Intimidating Speech
The UC policy also fails to deal with physically intimidating hate
speech. Although speech in public areas should be subject to lesser regu-
lation, this should not be true if the speech is physically threatening or
intimidating. Physically threatening speech should be banned no matter
where it is uttered. The UC policy may accomplish this with its prohibi-
tion on speech which creates "a hostile and intimidating environment."73
But considering the confusing nature of the policy, together with its fail-
ure to specify that it is the physical threat that is important here, it be-
hooves the university to be more explicit in banning physically
intimidating speech.
E. The Question of the Majority-Group Target
Another vital point that neither the "fighting words" doctrine gen-
erally nor the UC policy specifically consider is whether it makes any
difference whether the hate speech is directed at an individual member of
a majority group. Matsuda and Delgado correctly assert that in general
a campus hate speech policy should not apply to attacks on dominant-
group members.74 As Matsuda points out, the degree of harm felt by a
majority-group member is usually not as severe because such an attack is
not a perpetuation of historic racism and because such an individual has
readily accessible circles to flee to for support and reaffirmation. 75 More-
over, such lashing out is an important way that subjugated people can
struggle for a new self-identity in response to societal racism.76
However, Delgado correctly notes that incidents of racist speech
against majority group members must be evaluated on a case-by-case
73. HARASSMENT POLICY, supra note 58.
74. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2358; Delgado, supra note 16, at 180.
75. "The harm and hurt is there, but it is of a different degree. Because the attack is not
tied to the perpetuation of racist vertical relationships, it is not the paradigm worst example of
hate propaganda. The dominant-group member, hurt by conflict with the angry nationalist is
more likely to have access to a safe harbor of exclusive dominant-group interactions. Retreat
and reaffirmation of personhood are more easily attained for historically non-subjugated-group
members." Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2361.
76. Id. at 2362.
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basis because in some special situations the victims may deserve protec-
tion. The test for Delgado is whether the victim suffered harm from the
insult.77 Thus, a white student would have a cause of action as the target
of hate speech in a predominantly black university. In addition, anyone
would have a cause of action if speech created a physically threatening
environment. Of course, "[s]hould history change course, placing former
victim groups in a dominant or equalized position, the newly equalized
group will lose the special protection suggested here."7"
F. Due Process and Proportionate Punishment
Finally, the UC policy fails to mention explicitly what procedural
due process will be given alleged perpetrators and what the potential
range of punishment could be. Although the general university student
policies provide for notice, an opportunity to be heard, a chance to cross-
examine witnesses, and a way to appeal adverse decisions,79 we are left
without an indication about whether or not the full range of this proce-
dural due process applies to alleged violators of the hate speech provi-
sion. In addition, the student policies include punishments ranging from
written warning to dismissal to monetary fines,80 but the speech provi-
sion makes no reference to how these disciplines would apply in the hate
speech context.
If the full range of procedural due process is available to alleged
perpetrators, they should, if convicted, be subjected to strong yet propor-
tionate punishment, including lifetime expulsion from the university sys-
tem or a substantial fine. The only caveat is that if mandatory
attendance at special classes is the chosen punishment, a perpetrator
should be allowed to opt for a different punishment if attendance at that
class violates a legitimate religious belief held by the perpetrator.
Although not previously mentioned in this Note, most punishment
schemes under discussion and the University of Michigan policy specifi-
cally include mandatory attendance at special classes as one kind of
punishment.
G. Lessons from the Doe Decision
The University of Michigan policy was rejected in the federal courts
because its language, legislative history, and pattern of enforcement re-
vealed a very vague line between protected and unprotected speech. The
Doe court found that whether speech "involve[d] an express or implied
77. Delgado, supra note 16, at 179-80 n.275.
78. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2362.
79. POLIciEs APPLYING TO CAMPUS ACTIVITIES, supra note 57, at §§ 52.10-52.114.
80. Id. at §§ 52.130-52.139.
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threat to an individual's academic efforts" or "ha[d] the purpose or rea-
sonably foreseeable effect of interfering" was too vague and amorphous a
delineation to adequately protect the speakers' first amendment rights."1
In addition, the court emphasized that the "Administrator generally
failed to consider whether a comment was protected by the [flirst
[a]mendment before informing the accused student that a complaint had
been filed .... There is no evidence in the record that the Administrator
ever declined to pursue a complaint through attempted mediation be-
cause the alleged harassing conduct was protected by the [f]irst
[a]mendment. 8 2
Although vagueness is inherent whenever one tries to define prohib-
ited speech, the lesson to be learned from Doe is that the policy must be
as narrow as possible while remaining effective, and that in drafting and
enforcing such a provision a university must always be explicitly cogni-
zant of not banning protected speech.
IV
Proposing a Narrow Campus Hate Speech Exception to
the First Amendment
The inherent vagueness and awkwardness of trying to regulate cam-
pus hate speech within the judicial confines of a traditional first amend-
ment exception, as evidenced by the UC's noble, yet doomed, attempt,
impels agreement with Delgado that an entirely new narrow exception
should be framed to fight this cancer in our society.8 3 A separate excep-
tion would be an important signal from society that hate speech is a seri-
ous evil that will not be swept under the rug. Creating a specifically
tailored cause of action will make it much easier to write a provision that
is carefully drafted to avoid any impermissible prohibition of protected
first amendment speech.
An improved hate speech policy should have a preamble providing
much-needed explicit university recognition of the equal importance of
protecting hate speech victims and legitimate speech. The author sug-
gests that it then provide:
81. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989). See also supra
note 62.
82. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 866.
83. Delgado, supra note 16, at 179. After rejecting the causes of action of assault and
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and other constitutional and
statutory provisions as being too narrow and ill-suited to adequately provide a remedy to hate
speech victims, Delgado proposed a new tort for racial insults which would require the plaintiff
to prove that: "Language was addressed to him or her by the defendant that was intended to
demean through reference to race; that the plaintiff understood as intended to demean through
reference to race; and that a reasonable person would recognize as a racial insult." Id.
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I. University officials have an affirmative duty to take all constitu-
tionally permissible steps to eliminate a hostile educational envi-
ronment, including vehemently speaking out against hate speech,
developing educational and extracurricular activities that illumi-
nate and confront campus racism, creating counseling services
and support groups for hate speech victims, providing equal edu-
cational alternatives for victims of classroom hate speech, and
ending all unconstitutionally discriminatory campus policies,
procedures and practices.
11. University officials will punish speech only if the victim estab-
lishes by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(a) the speech or non-verbal symbol that by virtue of its form or
history, is commonly understood to express visceral hatred
for human beings on the basis of their group affiliation, is
intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or small identi-
fiable group of individuals on the basis of their sex, race,
color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and
ethnic origin with the purpose of inflicting emotional or
psychic injury upon its intended victims; and
(b) the speech or non-verbal symbol is addressed directly to the
individual or individuals whom it insults or stigmatizes or
occurs in areas where the intended targets are a captive audi-
ence (e.g., dormitory room, cafeteria, faculty office); except
(1) where the speech, or non-verbal symbol, occurs in a
classroom setting, it will only be prohibited if it is di-
rected at an individual or individuals in the class and
does not present a legitimate intellectual theory or opin-
ion which is germane to the issues under class discus-
sion; or
(c) the speech, or non-verbal symbol, constitutes a physical
threat or intimidation of an individual or individuals.
III. University officials, before proceeding against someone under
this policy, must always subject the alleged speech, or non-verbal
symbol, to review by the university's general counsel to deter-
mine if it is protected by the first amendment. In addition, the
policy is never used to impose a prior restraint upon speech.
IV. The policy is enforced consistently with due process protection,
including notice, an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
hearing, a right to cross-examine witnesses, and a right to review
of the decision; and any penalty is proportionate to the gravity of
the violation.
8 4
84. Compare Professor Thomas Grey's laudable proposal for a Stanford University regu-
lation, which lamentably still relies on the "fighting words" construct. The proposal states, in
pertinent part: "Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification if
it: a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of individuals on the
basis of their sex, race... ; and b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom
it insults or stigmatizes; and c) makes use of 'fighting words' or non-verbal symbols. In the
context of discriminatory harassment, 'fighting' words or non-verbal symbols are words, pic-
tures or other symbols that, by virtue of their form, are commonly understood to convey direct
and visceral hatred or contempt for human beings on the basis of their sex, race .... " Letter
from Professor Thomas C. Grey to Stanford University Student Conduct Legislative Council
at 2-3.
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Such a policy bypasses the clumsiness of a policy based on a "fight-
ing words" construction. It places prominently in the minds of univer-
sity officials the constant need to determine whether the alleged speech is
protected. It does not presume that hate speech is protected and it nar-
rowly defines the language and setting which would make such speech
actionable.
In public campus areas the proposed policy prohibits stigmatizing or
insulting speech directed at and intended to hurt an individual, or speech
that creates a physical threat to an individual, whether or not it is ad-
dressed specifically to that individual. In living or work areas, where the
expectation of privacy is much higher, it bars purposely injurious and
stigmatizing speech, whether or not directly addressed to an individual,
and physically threatening speech. In the special setting of the class-
room, the proposed policy balances the need for uninhibited and frank
class discussion with protection of students and faculty from personal
racist attacks hiding under the garb of academic freedom. Finally, it as-
sures the alleged perpetrator full due process and a fair punishment if
guilt is established.
If the battle to eliminate rampant campus racism is to succeed, how-
ever, any prosecutorial effort by the university to eliminate class-based
campus hostility must be matched by an equally vigorous non-adver-
sarial effort. The proposed policy begins by establishing an affirmative
duty of campus officials to combat the causes which produce hate speech.
A very practical example would be a mini-course on societal racism
that would be mandatory for all incoming students. The ungraded
course would not focus on academic historical discussion of the source of
racism, but rather on the personal impact of the hate speech on its vic-
tims. Instead of a lecturing professor, the students (and anyone else in
the university community who wished to attend) would encounter actual
victims telling their stories either in person or on film. The class might
also include either live or filmed presentations about self-proclaimed hate
groups including white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and skinheads. Groups
of hate speech victims could go to other classes, student, faculty, and
staff organizations, and residence halls to tell their story. Such programs
are vital because the real hope in ending class-based racism and hate
speech lies not in prosecution, but in cultural education and supportive
and illuminating social interaction.
Finally, a campus hate speech policy and educational effort is futile
if hate and racism rages on unchecked in "outside" society. Therefore, it
is essential that state or federal statutes, similar to the one Delgado pro-
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posed, 85 are drafted, enacted and enforced. The laws could be modeled
after this proposed policy, as all the concerns behind it, such as captive
audiences, apply equally to the non-campus setting.
Conclusion
Frozen at the first amendment bulkhead we watch the rising tide
of racial hatred wash over our schools and work places. Students vic-
timized by racist speech turn to our university administrations for re-
dress, and are told that the first amendment forecloses institutional
action. We owe those students a more thoughtful analysis than
absolutism .86
The UC policy, although a noble attempt to eschew absolutism and
address the real injury of hate speech victims, sweeps too much speech in
its grasp. This overbreadth and vagueness is caused primarily by reliance
on the inapplicable "fighting words" construction. The hate speech pol-
icy proposed in this Note suggests an independent first amendment ex-
ception that more clearly delineates the narrow confines of actionable
campus hate speech. More importantly, such a policy, together with a
university's educational effort and parallel state or federal statutes, would
loudly proclaim a forgotten fundamental precept: all human beings are
entitled to dignity, because every person has inherent worth.
85. See Delgado, supra note 16, at 179.
86. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2380 (emphasis added).
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.Addendum to Koepke Note
ACLU-NC Policy Concerning Racist And Other Group-based
Harrassment On College Campuses
The ACLU has always been committed to protecting freedom of
speech to guarantee the free exchange of ideas. This commitment in-
cludes the protection of speech which expresses unpopular or abhorrent
ideas, or uses language or modes of communication which are offensive.
Nowhere is this protection of greater importance than on our college
campuses, where the free exchange of ideas fosters knowledge, individual
growth, and tolerance for new and different ideas. As the Supreme Court
has observed, "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is
peculiarly 'the marketplace of ideas.'"
At the same time, the ACLU-NC is also committed to the proposi-
tion that on college campuses, full participation in the educational pro-
cess must be available on the nondiscriminatory basis to all, regardless of
race, sex, religion, national origin, sexual preference, disability, or mem-
bership in any other traditionally disadvantaged minority group. If mi-
nority students are forced to endure harrassment directed at them as
minority group members by other students or by college staff or teachers,
they may be functionally excluded from such full participation. If suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive, exposure to hostile expression based on group
membership can deny these students their right to full participation in
the educational process, with the result that historic patterns of discrimi-
nation are perpetuated, contrary to the constitutional objective of equal
protection.
In light of the [fjirst [a]mendment considerations outlined above,
however, any attempt to punish such harassment must be carefully
drawn so as to address the severe or pervasive nature of the conduct as
directly as possible, and to avoid infringement on the [flirst [a]mendment
protected expression of even repugnant ideas. In particular, campus pol-
icy should not bar the ability of professors to teach their philosophies or
students to express their views no matter how offensive, but must instead
focus on speech or expression used as a weapon to harass specific victims
on the basis of their protected status.
Accordingly the ACLU enacts the following policy:
Campus administrators are obligated to take all steps necessary
within constitutional bounds to minimize and eliminate a hostile edu-
cational environment which impairs access of protected minorities to
equal educational opportunities. Campus administrators must: speak
out vigorously against expressions of hatred or contempt based on
race, color, national or ethnic origin, alienage, sex, religion, sexual ori-
entation or disability; promote equality and mutual accommodation
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and understanding among these groups and the balance of the commu-
nity (including steps to assure diversity within the faculty, administra-
tion, staff, and student body and to incorporate into the curriculum
and extra-curricular activities educational efforts to reduce racism and
other forms of discrimination); and eliminate discriminatory educa-
tional policies, practices and procedures that exist on the campuses.
Campus administrators may not, however, enact campus codes of
conduct prohibiting discriminatory harassment of students, faculty,
administrators and staff on the basis of speech or expression unless at a
minimum all of the following conditions are met:
1. The code of conduct reaches only speech or expression that:
a) is specifically intended to and does harass an individual or spe-
cific individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, disability, reli-
gion, sexual orientation, alienage, or national and ethnic origin; and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it
harasses; and
c) creates a hostile and intimidating environment which the
speaker reasonably knows or should know will seriously and directly
impede the educational opportunities of the individual or individuals
to whom it is directly addressed; and
2. The code of conduct is enforced in a manner consistent with due
process protections (including the right of any individual charged with
violation to notice and a hearing), contains specific illustrations of ex-
pected occurrences which demonstrate when the policy does or does
not apply, is proportionate to the gravity of the violation, and does not
impose prior restraint upon expression.
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